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Forest and Climate Change Policy:
What are the costs of inaction?
Abstract
Deforestation and forest degradation are some of the main contributors to anthropogenic climate change. Accordingly, 
policies to arrest deforestation or increase forest areas are proposed 
as important forms of climate change policy. This paper summarizes 
current proposals for addressing the contribution of forests to climate 
change, and the political problems of implementing these policies, 
especially in developing countries. The paper argues that current 
estimates of the likely sequestration benefits and costs of forest policies 
need to be tempered according to the political barriers and need for 
local consultation in formulating and implementing these proposals. 
These problems are likely to be most felt concerning current plans for 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD).
Introduction
According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), one third of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions during the last 250 years have resulted 
from changes in land use, and especially deforestation. Sir Nicholas Stern’s report on climate change 
suggested avoiding this deforestation was a ‘highly cost-effective option’ to mitigate climate change 
(Stern, 2007: 537). Today, various schemes have been proposed to integrate forests into global climate 
change policy, which seek to protect existing forests, or plant new trees.
This paper summarizes the challenges and proposals to mitigate anthropogenic climate change, and 
with special reference to Southeast Asia. The paper argues that many projections of costs have been 
made about deforestation and forest policies concerning climate change. But these costs are difficult 
to assess without understanding the difficulties of implementing forest policies in diverse political 
settings in Asia, or without acknowledging the political opposition to some of these policy proposals.
The paper starts by considering the information about the impacts of deforestation on anthropogenic 
climate change. It then proceeds to analyse the different proposals for integrating forests into global 
climate change policy, and especially recent debates about Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
forest Degradation (REDD). The paper concludes by arguing that the estimated costs of deforestation 
and forest policies are of little benefit without also considering the costs and difficulties of formulating 
and implementing effective policies.
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Deforestation and anthropogenic climate change
According to recent statistics, Southeast Asia contributed 12 percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions in the year 2000 (WRI, 2008). Some 75 percent of these emissions came from land use change 
and forestry. Climate change policy in Southeast Asia is therefore clearly connected to forest policy at an 
unusually high level.
Deforestation contributes to climate change in three important ways. First, the removal of trees often 
includes the burning or decomposition of vegetal matter. These processes release carbon dioxide, but also 
the additional and more powerful greenhouse gases of nitrous oxide and methane. Second, removing, 
or changing land cover usually reduces the absorption (or sequestration) of carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere, and can change the reflection of heat into the atmosphere (or albedo). And thirdly, many 
new land uses might release further emissions, such as cattle ranching or enhanced fertilizer use, which 
also release methane and nitrous oxide. 
According to the IPCC (2007), global emissions from deforestation in 
the 1990s alone were estimated to be 5.8 Gigatons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent per year (Gt/CO2-eq/yr). Related to this change in land use 
and land cover, the IPCC (2007) also estimated that some 35-40 percent 
of global methane emissions arise from livestock-related emissions, and 
more than 60 percent of nitrous oxide emissions to fertilizer use (see 
Nabuurs et al, 2007).
These themes are particularly important In Southeast Asia. Indonesia is a 
country with large levels of forest, and alone accounted for 59 percent 
of the region’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2000 (WRI, 2008). The 
second highest emitter, in terms of proportion, was Thailand with just 
six percent. Indonesia also has the highest levels of deforestation in the 
region, of some 1.9 thousand hectares a year – although this is still some 
way behind the world’s leading deforester of Brazil with 3.1 thousand 
hectares (FAO, 2005). Myanmar has Southeast Asia’s second highest 
rate of deforestation with nearly five hundred thousand hectares. The 
Philippines and Papua New Guinea also feature highly. A key contributor 
to greenhouse gas emissions from forests is uncontrolled fires, such 
as occurring during drier (El Niño) years. According to one estimate, 
burning of rainforests and peatlands in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Papua 
New Guinea released an average of 128 million tons of carbon (or 
470 million tons of carbon dioxide) per year between 2000 and 2006. 
Borneo and Sumatra were largest sources (van der Werf et al 2008).
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Not surprisingly, much debate about mitigating climate change has focused on how 
these emissions related to deforestation can be controlled or reduced. Some of the most 
common suggestions are:
• Avoided Deforestation – or policies to reduce levels of deforestation, such as by  
 slowing down agricultural expansion or illegal logging.
• Afforestation and Reforestation – afforestation is planting trees in new   
 locations, reforestation is replacing lost trees. When conducted well, planting trees  
 can also increase the fixing of carbon in soil through the growth of roots and the  
 accumulation  of organic matter.
• Extend the carbon retention of harvested wood products – this allows wood  
 products to be used for longer before they deteriorate. For example, it might   
 mean protecting wood products used in housing or construction, or reducing the  
 disposal of wood through burning.
• Product Substitution – finding alternatives to wood to supply certain products or 
 services such as fuelwood.
• Producing biomass for bio-energy – for example, some tree crops such as oil  
 palm can replace fossil fuels or even reduce demand for fuelwood. Indeed, the   
 IPCC (2007) has estimated that biomass from forestry can contribute roughly   
 0.4-4.4 GtCO2/yr depending on whether biomass replaces coal or gas in  
 power plants.
Related to these, the IPCC (2007) also estimated the potential contribution of these 
actions towards mitigating climate change. These estimates are based on assuming a 
carbon price of 100 US$/tCO2-eq. Furthermore, there is a range of estimates according 
to whether mitigation is estimated using global climate models or ground surveys and 
additional data. Using the more conservative ground survey data, forest policies could 
mitigate between 1.3 and 4.2 GtCO2-eq/yr (or an average 2.7) in 2030. Using the more 
ambitious global models, this number rises to 13.8 GtCO2-eq/yr in 2030.
The IPCC also estimates that about half of these actions could be achieved at a cost of under 
20 US$/tCO2 (or, approximately 1,550 MtCO2/yr). But, clearly, the costs and attractiveness 
of different options vary according to location and activities. One important debate is 
whether it is more attractive to implement forest policies in developed or developing 
countries. Developing countries are often considered more attractive for forest policies 
because much deforestation is occurring in these countries now. Furthermore, labour, 
land and inputs can be cheaper than in developed countries. Trees often grow faster in 
tropical climates. Accordingly, the IPCC (2007) has estimated that the costs of carbon 
sequestration forestry projects can vary between 0.5 US$ to 7 US$/tCO2 in developing 
countries, and between 1.4 US$ to 22 US$/tCO2 in developed countries (Cacho et al., 
2003; Richards and Stokes, 2004). But all of these figures are openly acknowledged to 
be estimates and hence likely to contain errors (see Nabuurs et al, 2007).
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Figure 1 shows the IPCC (2007) summaries for the likely impacts, costs, and timing of costs associated 
with each of the proposed mitigation activities involving forest policies. This diagram shows, for example, 
that increasing the forest area might have upfront costs but long-term benefits. In macro terms, the Stern 
Review (2007) estimated that halving global deforestation would cost around US$5 billion per year. 
Figure 1: Estimates of the timing of costs and impacts for forest-based climate 
change mitigation policies (IPCC, 2007) (note: C = carbon)
Mitigation Activities
Type of 
Impact
Timing of 
Impact
Timing of 
Cost
1A
1B
2A
2B
3A
3B
4A
4B
Increased forest area 
eg. new forests)
Maintain forest area 
(eg. prevent deforestation, LUC)
Increase site-level C density 
(eg. intensive management, fertilize)
Maintain site-level C density 
(eg. avoid degradation)
Increase landscape-scale C stocks 
(eg. SFM, agriculture etc)
Maintain landscape scale C stocks 
(eg. suppress disturbances)
Increase off-site C in products 
(but must also meet 1B, 2B and 3B)
Increase bioenergy and substitution 
(but must also meet 1B, 2B and 3B)
Legend
Type of Impact
Enhance sink
Reduce source
Timing  
*change in Carbon over time
Enhance sink
Reduce source
Timing of cost 
*dollars ($) over time
Enhance sink
Reduce source
Sustained or 
repeatable On-going
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Political opposition
Implementing these forest policies globally, however, 
has encountered controversy. One the earliest 
controversies lies over the extent to which controlling 
deforestation in developing countries is an ethical 
or appropriate request to make to countries that 
are undergoing industrialization. In 1990, the US-
based think tank, the World Resources Institute (WRI) 
published a report concerning national responsibility 
for anthropogenic climate change that was 
based on an index that gave particular attention to 
rates of deforestation (WRI, 1990; later published 
as Hamilton et al 1991). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this 
report listed China, India and Brazil among the top 
six emitting countries.
This report started one of the most famous disputes 
in global environmental politics. In response, the 
Indian NGO, the Centre for Science and Environment 
(CSE), published a critical report called Global 
Warming in an Unequal World (Agarwal and Narain, 
1991). In this report, the CSE pointed out that the 
WRI index was based on total national emissions, 
rather than on per capita emissions. At the time 
of the report, the USA had per capita emissions of 
approximately six tons per person, while India and 
China had less than 0.5 tons. Secondly, the index 
used highly simplistic estimates for both deforestation 
and methane emissions. For example, estimates 
of wet-rice methane emissions were extrapolated 
globally from Italian figures; deforestation was treated 
uniformly, with no distinction made between export-
led logging and smallholder food production; and 
no account was taken of the impacts of vegetation 
that might replace forest. Thirdly, the index focused 
chiefly on current tropical deforestation, and did not 
consider historic deforestation in developed countries 
(which is important as greenhouse gases can exist 
for many years).
Together, these arguments implied that the 
standardized statistical analysis applied by WRI did not 
take into account important questions of social justice 
in greenhouse gas emissions, concerning whether 
deforestation in developing countries was because 
of poverty and food production. Moreover, they also 
implied that developed countries should not ask 
developing countries to protect forests when richer 
countries had already conducted deforestation, and 
when many current greenhouse gas emissions might 
be linked to affluence rather than just livelihoods.
These themes have influenced debates about the 
role of forests within climate change policy since. 
At the First Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) at Berlin, in 1995, it was agreed in principle 
to investigate the possibility for achieving future 
national greenhouse gas emission reduction targets 
through investing in projects in other countries. This 
tentative agreement led to the establishment of so-
called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) as a pilot 
phase for international cooperation on reducing 
greenhouse gas concentrations, and which saw a 
number of carbon-offset forestry projects established 
in a number of countries by large emitters such as 
Japan and the USA. Such projects were also supported 
by additional organizations such as the United States 
Initiative on Joint Implementation, and by the World 
Bank Prototype Carbon Fund (operational from 2000).
The arguments for forest-based climate change 
policies were clear. Forests offered important 
contributions to greenhouse gas concentrations, 
and protecting, or increasing forest areas, could 
reduce these concentrations. Moreover, statistics 
from the IPCC (mentioned above) suggested that 
so-called ‘sinks,’ or land-use, based investments in 
developing countries could be significantly cheaper 
than projects in richer countries, or projects involving 
industrial technology and energy efficiency. Many 
developing countries, however criticised forests-based 
projects because they saw these investments as ways 
of clever accounting to allow richer countries to 
avoid responsibility for reducing emissions at home. 
Moreover, some developing countries preferred to 
see investment go towards industrial technology 
transfer, and feared that forests projects might not 
assist with industrialization, and might even reduce 
livelihood opportunities for poorer farmers. Critics 
also claimed that forest projects that could generate 
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good sequestration and local development benefits would always be more costly than 
those predicted by the IPCC.
As a result of these concerns, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol produced a compromise under the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM was one of the three so-called flexible 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, which also included Joint Implementation (allowing 
climate-friendly investment within Annex I countries), and Emissions Trading (between 
the national targets of Annex I countries). (Annex I countries are the richer countries that 
had specific greenhouse gas-reduction targets allocated to them at Kyoto).
The CDM was different to other flexible mechanisms because it specifically referred to 
investment in climate-friendly activities from Annex I countries in non-Annex I countries 
(usually developing countries). Furthermore, the CDM was intended to offer a ‘development 
dividend’ that helped create local sustainable development in host countries as well as 
cheap climate change mitigation (see Grubb et al, 1999).
But the demand for forests-based climate investment was still strong. For many 
environmentalists, reforestation has been represented as somewhat of a ‘magic bullet’ 
to address a range of environmental problems comprising climate change; declining 
biodiversity; controlling erosion and water shortages; and the aesthetics of lost wilderness. 
For example, the British explorer and popular writer, Robin Hanbury-Tenison, wrote, 
somewhat romantically:
Carbon sinks… these are exactly the elements of the Kyoto protocol that offer our 
last hope of saving the rain forests. 
(Hanbury-Tenison, 2001)
And Lester Brown, a founder member of the Worldwatch Institute wrote:
Restoring forests… means reversing decades of tree cutting and land clearing with 
forest restoration, an activity that will require millions of people planting billions of 
trees. …A small area devoted to plantations may be essential to protecting forests at 
the global level…. At present tree plantations cover some 113 million hectares. An 
expansion of these by at last half, along with a continuing rise in productivity, is likely 
to be needed both to satisfy future demand and to eliminate one of the pressures 
that are shrinking forests. This, too, presents a huge opportunity for investment. 
 
(Lester Brown, 2001:82, 85, 95)
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But against these kinds of statements, critics argued that simply planting trees as a response to increasing 
greenhouse gas concentrations was partly a strategy to reduce pressure for reducing industrial emissions 
at source. Indeed, one reporter noted that an official at the US Department of Energy allegedly claimed 
in 1994 that ‘tree planting will allow US energy policy to go on with business as usual out to 2015’ (in 
Lohmann, 1999:2). There was also worry that emphasizing plantation forestry would restrict local livelihoods 
and development options within poorer countries. One angry African negotiator told a meeting in London 
in 1997, ‘Our countries are not toilets for your emissions!’ (Forsyth, 1999:255). Similarly, other critics, such 
as the Uruguay-based NGO, the World Rainforest Movement, have claimed that carbon offset forestry is 
equivalent to ‘CO2lonialism.’ 
Furthermore, many observers have pointed out, rightly, that carbon-offset forestry is difficult to measure 
on account of establishing clear baselines for measuring the additionality of projects, or whether forest 
conservation in location might cause ‘leakage’, or displacing deforestation elsewhere (Cullet and Kameri-
Mbote, 1998). Such concerns, in turn, have influenced how forests have been defined by the UNFCCC. 
Between 1997 and 2000, some 130 definitions of ‘forest’ were mentioned in debates among states alone, 
before a universal definition of forest was defined by the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC at The 
Hague in November 2000:
‘Forest’ is an area of land of 0.3–1.0 hectares (ha) with tree crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) 
of more than 10–30 percent with trees with the potential to reach a minimum height of 2–5 meters 
(m) at maturity in situ. A forest may consist either of closed forest formation where trees of various 
storeys and undergrowth cover a high proportion of the ground; or open forest formations over an area 
of 0.3–1.0 ha with a continuous vegetation cover in which tree crown cover exceeds 10-20 percent. 
Young natural stands and all plantations which have yet to reach a crown density of 10–30 percent 
or tree height of 2–5 m are included under forest (UNFCCC/ SBSTA/ 2000/ CRP.11; pp.7, November 
2000) (UNFCCC, 2000).
This definition is useful because it clarifies which kinds of forest are permissible for accreditation under the 
UNFCCC. But it also excludes certain forms of land cover such as savanna that have been called forests by 
biologists, or the various social and livelihood services offered by forest ecosystems. This definition of ‘forest’ 
is also related to the debate concerning official certification of forests through other means, such as by the 
Forest Stewardship Council, which has provided official certification to several monoculture plantations, to 
the concern of NGOs such as the World Rainforest Movement.
Indeed, in 2000, a number of NGO activists, including representatives from Greenpeace and the Rainforest 
Action Network, signed the ‘Mount Tamalpais Declaration’ (after the site in California) to oppose the use of 
the CDM for supporting plantations, and to urge greater consultation of local users of forests in decisions 
about climate change policy. 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD)
REDD is the proposal to incorporate forests into climate change policy by rewarding actors for slowing down 
deforestation, or taking further action to increase forest areas. It is a market-based mechanism that allows 
actors to demonstrate climate-friendly activities concerning forests, and then to sell these achievements on 
the international carbon market. Furthermore, REDD is also a political mechanism that can allow developing 
countries with large areas of forest to participate in, and benefit from, the UN Climate Change Convention. 
In effect it offers incentives such as payments to countries, and sub-state actors to protect forests.
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For the sake of clarity, it is worth defining some terms. 
The basic term of REDD refers to the ability to slow 
down deforestation by taking demonstrable action 
to reduce emissions resulting from deforestation and 
the degradation of forest areas. Over time, however, 
two further terms have emerged. REDD+ refers to 
the reduction of deforestation in addition to acts of 
afforestation and reforestation. And REDD+ with 
co-benefits refers to all of these activities plus the 
establishment of additional socio-economic benefits 
such as livelihood options for people living in forest 
areas, or the enhancement of local biodiversity. As 
discussed above, the historic debates about the role 
of forests in climate change policy has influenced 
these terms. Many negotiators would like to see 
REDD+ as a policy focusing mainly on mitigation of 
climate change. REDD+ with co-benefits, however, 
is more attractive to negotiators who wish to see a 
more holistic form of climate change policy that can 
provide a ‘development dividend’, and which avoids 
social impacts of controlling land use change.
The objectives of REDD (or its associated terms) 
are, again, very clear. Changes to forest and land 
use are important contributors to rising greenhouse 
gas concentrations. To date, efforts to reduce 
deforestation have been hampered because 
deforestation is caused by many diverse factors, 
such as commercial logging; illegal logging; and 
agricultural expansion by state-led activities in 
countries such as Indonesia and Brazil, or by large-
scale settlement and food production by poorer 
populations in developing countries. International 
treaties to address deforestation have also been 
difficult because many developing countries with 
forests have rejected the idea that they should not 
use their forest resources when so many developed 
countries have already done so. Moreover, in some 
countries states have little domestic capacity to control 
local governments or farming communities who wish 
to extend agricultural production into forest areas. 
The question of ‘avoided deforestation’ has also been 
discussed at UNFCCC meetings for some years, but 
with controversy. Many scientific observers rightly 
pointed to the contribution of land-use change 
and deforestation to global anthropogenic climate 
change. But some developing countries such as Brazil, 
and NGOs such as Greenpeace argued that avoided 
deforestation was a spurious concept because it 
focused on emissions that were not yet occurring, 
and that international discussions should focus on 
reducing industrial greenhouse gas emissions at 
source. Moreover, as with most activities involving 
forests and climate change, it can be very difficult 
to demonstrate additional and measurable changes 
to carbon sequestration, or overall declines in 
deforestation – although in principle, these 
measurements are technically feasible.
Since 2000, however, there have been important steps 
towards incorporating the principles of REDD into 
global climate change policies. One important step 
here was the ninth UNFCCC Conference of the Parties 
in Milan in 2003, which was known as the ‘forests 
conference’ because it involved much discussion on 
establishing rules and methodologies for evaluating 
afforestation and reforestation. This was followed by 
the creation of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations 
(CfRN) in 2005, after a speech by Sir Michael Somare, 
Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea at Columbia 
University. (The economist, Jeffrey Sachs, who works 
at Columbia was an important encourager of this 
initiative). The aim of the Coalition was to bring 
together developing countries with large areas of 
forest in order to make a unified voice calling for 
economic incentives for forest conservation. At the 
thirteenth UNFCCC Conference of the Parties at Bali 
in 2007, some agreement on forests (incorporating 
REDD) was mentioned as part of the so-called Bali 
Roadmap, which was a list of important themes to 
be clarified before the agreement of the post-Kyoto 
climate agreement.
One of the important dilemmas of REDD is to 
incorporate countries with different levels of 
forest cover. Figure 2 demonstrates a common 
representation of the so-called Forest Transition. 
This concept is based on the idea that countries 
will initially have a large area of forest cover, which 
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will decline as population and economic or agricultural development increases. Rewarding countries for 
avoiding deforestation, or increasing forest areas, might therefore require providing different mechanisms 
for both sides of the Forest Transition. Countries with existing forest stocks might require funds to help 
protect forests and build monitoring systems to ensure this is happening. Countries that have already lost 
forest areas might need different funds to increase forests. Figure 2 shows this proposed transition for the 
case of Vietnam (Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2009) – although it is worth noting this model is controversial for 
reasons stated below.
Figure 2: The Forest Transition (as reported in Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2009)
The UNFCCC negotiations have accordingly proposed a variety of levels to the REDD mechanism (UNFCCC, 
2006). Proposals are for three key funds:
• The basic REDD Mechanism: providing credits for countries that have produced demonstrable   
 reductions in emissions resulting from deforestation or forest degradation. These credits can then  
 to be sold in international carbon markets.
• A REDD Stabilisation Fund: to encourage countries that have already stabilised deforestation to   
 continue (and hence avoid perverse incentives for these countries to increase deforestation in   
 order to be rewarded under REDD for then reducing them).
• And a REDD Enabling Fund: to provide upfront finance to build capacity for countries without   
 accounting or monitoring infrastructure. These funds could be paid to countries such as   
 Myanmar or the Democratic Republic of Congo, which have relatively larger areas of existing   
 forest, but little official capacity to monitor rates of deforestation or illegal logging.
Furthermore, new funding for REDD-related activities have emerged from the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund 
(2004), and Forest Carbon Partnership Fund (2007). The Global Environment Facility has provided a new 
Tropical Forest Account, and the UN has its new REDD Programme. Various other regionally specific funds 
have also emerged such as the Congo Basin Forest Fund; the Norwegian Forest and Climate Initiative; and 
the Asia-Pacific based International Forest Carbon Initiative. Private-sector investment might also be attracted 
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and forthcoming. In one estimate, the Stern Review (2007) proposed that halving global 
deforestation would cost around $5 billion per year.
But, predictably, there are also many important question marks and criticisms of current 
proposals for REDD. We have already mentioned the ongoing problems of measuring 
reduced deforestation, additionality and leakage. But in addition, some critics have argued 
that REDD (or REDD+) in its current proposed form does not take into account the needs 
and rights of local forest users, or the implications of REDD+ for large-scale industrial 
plantations. According to one representative of the NGO, the Forest People’s Programme, 
‘there is a growing realisation that REDD policies as currently proposed contain 
serious moral hazards because they plan to reward polluters with a history of forest 
destruction, but would fail to recognise and reward the role of indigenous and local 
forest custodians who protect and sustainably use standing forests’ (Griffiths, 2008: 2).
Some research on existing payment for environmental services schemes have also 
suggested that poorer, forest-dependent people might not always benefit. For example, 
Granda (2005) assessed a Dutch-sponsored monoculture tree plantation in Ecuador, and 
concluded there were immense costs and problems in implementing a meaningful level of 
participation within the scheme. The research claimed communities were never informed 
by the carbon forestry company about payments they would receive per hectare; local 
people did not know the purpose of carbon credits; they did not know about penalty 
clauses, and consequently were now in debt in order to pay such penalties. Villagers also 
felt aggrieved they had to pay all unforeseen costs of forest plantations, such as failed 
seedlings or fire damage.
A further report by Greenpeace (2007) in the Democratic Republic of Congo argued that 
the World Bank’s strategies there increased, rather than avoided deforestation, by using 
logging as a form of economic development – and that logging titles have frequently been 
allocated without acknowledging local land rights. Indeed, the report claimed payments 
of just salt and beer have been made to community leaders in return for logging rights. 
In another study of the World Bank in Guyana, Griffiths (2008: 11) argued, ‘the national 
REDD concept submitted to the [Forest Carbon Partnership Fund]… contains misleading 
and inaccurate information on land tenure, governance and deforestation,’ and that in 
Peru, the Bank’s technical advisors explicitly refused to acknowledge forest peoples as 
key rights holders in REDD.
These kinds of problems have given rise to a new term in forest management of carbon 
tenure. Carbon tenure is the rights of individuals or the state to hold, or profit from the 
ability to use forests for purposes of climate change mitigation. In Papua New Guinea 
in 2008, local farmers were surprised to learn that the national government claimed 
all carbon rights relating to forests in this country. On one hand, this decision gives the 
state more incentives to agree to, and implement REDD-based policies. On the other 
hand, some critics see this as restricting the rights of local landholders. (Marshall, 2008)
Furthermore, some critics such as the World Rainforest Movement have claimed that the 
movement towards REDD+ (including afforestation and reforestation rather than avoided 
deforestation alone) will legitimise the movement towards large-scale plantations, rather 
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than the protection of old-growth forest. Indeed, large-scale industrial plantations can 
frequently sequester more carbon than old-growth, or more biodiverse forests because 
the newer forests grow more quickly. Consequently, the model of the Forest Transition 
(see Figure 2) is useful for showing forest land cover alone: it says nothing about forest 
quality, or the proportion of forest land covered by plantations. 
In response to these dilemmas, development-oriented NGOs have called for a more 
inclusive and longer-term approach to planning REDD or REDD+ in developing countries. 
For example, one approach known as Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) has been 
urged by various analysts (Forest People Programme, 2007; Global Witness, 2008; 
Wilson, 2009). Indeed, Griffiths (2005, 2008) has argued that the World Bank approach 
to forest-related climate investment has used the term ‘consultation’ to imply a higher 
level of participation than actually achieved, and that FPIC should be the driving principle 
for REDD projects. 
The arguments for implementing a more inclusive form of REDD are to ensure that 
local people do not have livelihoods restricted by heavy-handed regulations or new 
plantations. Moreover, extra consultation will probably lead to more successful of REDD 
policies if local people are in favour of them and understand the objectives. The argument 
against more consultation is that it takes more time raise costs. But there are some 
emerging examples of successful implementation of REDD, or models that can involve 
more consultation. Wilson (2009: 31) outlines the activities by one investor (Veracel) for 
ensuring social participation in Brazil. These activities include a social networks program 
(to engage communities with collaborations); a social inventory (to map communities); 
social articulation and mobilisation (to allow business employees to work with 
communities); and dialogues with local governments and neighbouring landowners. 
Veracel’s main work is in eucalyptus plantations, but it also engages in environmental 
restoration in degraded land.
Conclusion: What are the costs?
Forest policies are fundamentally important for any international regime to address 
anthropogenic climate change. There is no doubt that addressing problems of deforestation 
and forest degradation will impact beneficially on global attempts to mitigate climate 
change. It will also bring benefits to protecting biodiversity, and – if done in a consultative 
way – will also help address poverty and development by maintaining and protecting 
local livelihoods in poorer countries.
But the discussions about formulating and implementing forests-based climate change 
policies are so far dominated by discussions of their costs and benefits that do not take 
into account the political realities of what these policies actually mean, or need, in order 
to be implemented successfully.
For example, this paper started by repeating Sir Nicholas Stern’s initial statement that 
avoided deforestation was a ‘highly cost-effective option’ (Stern, 2007: 537). Moreover, 
the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007) has stated that forest-based projects are likely 
to be significantly cheaper in developing countries than in richer countries.
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But Stern later added: ‘clarity over boundaries and ownership, and the 
allocation of property rights regarded as just by local communities, will 
enhance the effectiveness of property rights in practice and strengthen 
the institutions required to support and enforce them’ (Stern, 2007: 
541). Yet, these actions are necessary in order to make forest-based 
climate change policies work. Moreover, paying attention to these 
matters will also probably mean that political opposition to REDD or 
other forest-based policies will not undermine the suggestion in the first 
place. Neither Stern nor the IPCC (2007) pay any attention to how these 
considerations will affect initial estimates of costs or cost effectiveness. 
In particular, many estimates within the IPCC (2007) Fourth Assessment 
Report are based on an assumption that carbon prices might reach 
US$100 per ton. In late 2009, the European Trading System priced 
one ton at close to €14. Much more public acceptance of the need 
for carbon trading, and a resulting rise in carbon prices need to occur 
before we can accept these estimates based on higher carbon prices.
REDD (and its associated forms), of course, is still in its early days. 
Cautionary examples should not be taken as proof that REDD will fail. 
But it would be foolish to assume that difficult tensions between different 
stakeholders can be ignored. If REDD is to succeed – and especially where 
there are local forest users – there is a need for a multi-actor, multi-level 
form of governance that can anticipate different capacities, objectives, 
and values of various stakeholders. Some analysts might consider that 
these processes are too time consuming or costly. The obvious response 
to these concerns are that implementing policy without acknowledging 
different values and objectives between stakeholders will only result in 
failure, and in an additional loss of trust in the UNFCCC and climate 
change policy process. The climate change negotiations need more 
attention to these political processes rather than just considering simple 
estimates of the likely impacts of policies on greenhouse gases, or the 
relative costs without considering these politics.
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